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Abstract
We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents’ preferences are
single-peaked. In this paper we identify the family of eﬃcient, fair and non-manipulable
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We face up in this paper the problem of allocating an amount of indivisible units of an homoge-
neous good among a group of agents whose preferences are single-peaked. Consider the following
situation. At a health center there are some shifts to cover by doctors. Each of these doctors
has a single-peaked preference over worked hours. This means that she has a most preferred
amount of hours to work. And, if she has to work more than this preferred amount, the less
the better. Analogously, if she has to work less than this preferred amount the more the better.
Similar problems arise in the allocation of crew members to ﬂights or teaching hours to faculty
members, among other examples.
The above situation is a particular instance of a general set of problems called allocation problems
with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked. These problems come described by three
elements. First, a set of agents. Second, an amount of indivisible units to distribute, called task.
And third, a proﬁle of single-peaked preferences over the number of units to consume. A rule or
solution is a mechanism to distribute the task among the agents according to their preferences.
In the axiomatic method, solutions are justiﬁed in terms of the properties they fulﬁl, and, in
general, suitable combinations of diﬀerent desirable properties are used to diﬀerentiate among
rules. In this paper we identify the class of rules that, applied to the allotment of indivisible
units, are eﬃcient, fair, non-manipulable, and robust. We refer to such a family of rules as
M-temporary satisfaction methods. These methods are deﬁned by using monotonic standards of
comparison deﬁned over the cartesian product potential agents-integer numbers.1 M-temporary
satisfaction methods start by giving all agents their preferred consumptions, and then move
away from this provisional allocation, unit by unit by using the standard. Here, the numbers
paired with the agents are interpreted either as agents’ peaks or the opposite peaks, depending
upon the type of problem at hand (either an excess demand or excess supply problem).
By far, the best-known rule in the continuous case, when the task is perfectly divisible, is
the uniform rule, introduced in Sprumont (1991). It proposes to treat all agents as equally as
possible, subject to eﬃciency. Characterizations of this rule also appear in Ching (1994), S¨ onmez
(1994), Thomson (1994a,b), and Dagan (1996), among others. The uniform rule is eﬃcient,
equitable, and non-manipulable. It is worth noting that M-temporary satisfaction methods are
close to the idea inspiring the uniform rule. This statement is supported by two facts. First,
M-temporary satisfaction methods can be characterized by combinations of properties similar
to those supporting the characterizations of the uniform rule. And second, for any problem,
the allocation prescribed by the uniform rule is the ex-ante expectation of the agents under
the application of M-temporary satisfaction methods, if all plausible monotonic standards are
equally likely.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we set up the model. In Section 3
we analyze the properties our families of rules may fulﬁl. In Section 4 we introduce standards of
1This subclass of standards of comparison has been formulated by Herrero and Mart´ ınez (2006) in the context








comparison and use them to construct an allotment procedure (temporary satisfaction methods);
we present our characterization result as well. In Section 5 we establish the connections between
the M-temporary satisfaction methods and the uniform rule. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude
with some ﬁnal remarks. Examples providing the tightness of the characterizations are relegated
to Appendix A, while proofs are in Appendix B.
2 Statement of the model
A preference relation, R, deﬁned over Z+ is single-peaked if there exists an integer number
p(R) ∈ Z+ (called the peak of R) such that, for each a,b ∈ Z+,
aPb ⇔ [(b < a < p(R)) or (p(R) < a < b)],
where P is the strict preference relation induced by R. Let S denote the class of all single-peaked
preferences deﬁned over Z+. Let N be the set of all potential agents and N be the family of all
ﬁnite non-empty subsets of N.
An allocation problem with single-peaked preferences, or simply a problem, is a triple
e = (N,T,R) in which a ﬁxed number of units T (called task) has to be distributed among
a group of agents, N ∈ N, whose preferences over consumption are single-peaked,
R = (Ri)i∈N ∈ SN. Let AN denote the class of problems with ﬁxed-agent set N, and A
the class of all problems, that is,
AN =







For each problem, we face the question of ﬁnding a division of the task among the agents. An
allocation for e ∈ A is a list of integer numbers, x ∈ ZN
+, satisfying the condition of being a
complete distribution of the task, i.e.,
P
i∈N xi = T. Let X(e) be the set of all allocations for
e ∈ A. A rule is a function, F : A −→ ZN
+, that selects, for each problem e ∈ A, a unique
allocation F(e) ∈ X(e).
3 Properties
Our goal in this paper is to obtain eﬃcient, fair, non-manipulable, and robust rules to solve
allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked.
One basic requirement for a rule to satisfy is eﬃciency. An allocation is eﬃcient if there is









Eﬃciency: For each e ∈ A, there is no allocation x ∈ X(e) such that, for each i ∈ N, xiRiFi(e),
and for some j ∈ N, xjPjFj(e).
As Sprumont (1991) points out, the principle of eﬃciency is equivalent to asking for each agent to
consume, no more than her peak when the task is too little, and no less than her peak when the
task is too much. Equivalently, if F is eﬃcient, Fi(e) ≤ p(Ri) for each i ∈ N if
P
i∈N p(Ri) ≥ T,
and Fi(e) ≥ p(Ri) for each i ∈ N if
P
i∈N p(Ri) ≤ T.
In any rationing framework, a minimal fairness condition is always desirable. The equal treatment
of equals principle says that agents with identical preferences should be indiﬀerent among their
respective allocations. Paired with the requirement of eﬃciency, it simply means that agents
with identical preferences should be allotted the same amount. Unfortunately, no rule can fulﬁll
equal treatment of equals in the context of problems with indivisibilities. To illustrate such a
fact it is enough to consider a two-agent problem with identical preferences and only one unit
to assign. Young (1994), and Herrero and Mart´ ınez (2006) formulate a milder version of this
condition: balancedness. It postulates that equal agents should be treated, if not equal, at least
as equal as possible. Balancedness requires the awards of equal agents to diﬀer, at most, by one
unit (representing this unit the size of the indivisibility).
Balancedness: For each e ∈ A and each {i,j} ⊆ N, if Ri = Rj then |Fi(e) − Fj(e)| ≤ 1.
In this class of problems is quite common that agents report their preferences directly to a
central planer. This opens the door to some possible manipulation from agents by lying about
their preferences. Next property prevents this type of manipulation to occur. Strategy-proofness
requires that truthtelling should be a (weakly) dominant strategy for all agents, or, in other
words, that no agent should beneﬁt from misrepresenting her preference.2
Strategy-proofness: For each e = (N,T,(Ri,R−i)) ∈ A and each e0 = (N,T,(R0
i,R−i)) ∈ A,
Fi(e)RiFi(e0).
Next property refers to an stability condition with respect to changes in population. Suppose
that, after solving the problem e = (N,T,R) ∈ A, a proper subset of agents, S ⊂ N, decides
to reallocate the total amount they have received, that is, they face a new allocation problem:
(S,
P
i∈S ai,RS), where RS = (Ri)i∈S and a is the allocation corresponding to apply the rule
to the problem e. Consistency requires no agent to take advantage from this change in the
population, i.e., each agent i ∈ S receives the same amount of units in problem (S,
P
i∈S ai,RS)
as she did in problem e. In other words, the new reallocation is only a restriction to the subset
S of the initial one.3
Consistency: For each e ∈ A, each S ⊂ N, and each i ∈ S, Fi(e) = Fi(S,
P
j∈S Fj(e),RS).
2The notation R−i refers to the preference proﬁle R where agent i has been deleted, i.e., R−i = RNr{i}.








4 A family of rules. Temporary satisfaction methods
We face now the question of ﬁnding rules satisfying the properties formulated in Section 3.
A standard of comparison is a linear order (complete, antisymmetric and transitive binary
relation) over the cartesian product potencial agent-integer number, N × Z, such that, for each
agent, larger integer numbers have priority over smaller integer numbers.4
Standard of comparison σ : N × Z −→ Z such that, for each i ∈ N, and each a ∈ Z,
σ(i,a + 1) < σ(i,a). Let Σ denote the class of all standards of comparison.5
By using standards of comparison, we can construct rules to solve allocation problems. We
may accommodate all units of either excess demand or excess supply one by one, after giving
(temporarily) all agents their peaks. We call those rules temporary satisfaction methods.
Let {(i,ai)}i∈M be a collection of pairs agent-number. Let σ ∈ Σ be a standard of comparison.
The pair with the highest priority in {(i,ai)}i∈M, according to σ, is the pair (i,ai) such
that σ(i,ai) < σ(j,aj) for all j ∈ M r {i}.
Temporary satisfaction method associated to σ, TSσ: Let e ∈ A. Start by giving to each
agent her peak. Now we distinguish two cases.
(1) If the task is too little, i.e.,
P
i∈N p(Ri) ≥ T. In this case we have to remove some units
from the temporary allocation. Associate to each agent her peak, that is, ai = p(Ri).
Identify the pair with the highest priority according to σ. Subtract one unit from this agent
(allocation), and reduce her number by one unit. Identify again the pair with the highest
priority according to σ, and proceed in the same way until reaching the task.
(2) If the task is too large, i.e.,
P
i∈N p(Ri) ≤ T. In this case we have to allocate some extra
units, T0 = T −
P
i∈N p(Ri). We shall proceed in the following way. Associate to each agent
the opposite of her peak, that is, ai = −p(Ri). Identify the pair with the highest priority
according to σ. Then assign one unit of the remaining task, T0, to this agent, and reduce
her number by one unit. Identify again the pair with the highest priority according to σ,
and proceed in the same way until the task T0 runs out.
Next example illustrates how temporary satisfaction methods work.
Example 4.1. Assume that the standard of comparison σ is such that, restricted to agents in
N = {1,2,3}, it happens that σ(2,x) < σ(1,y) < σ(3,z), for all x,y,z ∈ Z. Now, consider the
allocation problem where N = {1,2,3}, T = 6, and R = (R1,R2,R3) such that R2 = R3 and
p(R) = (1,5,5). Note that, in this case,
P
i∈N p(Ri) > T.
We start by fully satisfying all agents, that is, by giving to each agent her peak. This implies
allocating 11 units, but we only have 6 units available. Thus we need to remove 5 units. To do
4The notion of standard of comparison was formulated by Young (1994).








that we procede as follows. Since we are in case (1) (
P
i∈N p(Ri) = 11 ≥ 6 = T), we identify
each agent with her peak, that is, we consider the pairs (1,1), (2,5), and (3,5). According to σ,
the pair with the highest priority is (2,5). Then we subtract one unit from agent 2, and we now
consider the new pairs (1,1), (2,4), and (3,5). According to σ, the pair with the highest priority
is (2,4). Then we subtract one unit from agent 2, we consider the new pairs (1,1), (2,3), and
(3,5). The table shows the rest of the procedure until the 5 units have been removed. The ﬁrst
column shows the kth unit of the task. We start from 11 units and we remove one by one up to
reach 6 units. The second column shows the allocation up to that unit, x(k). The third column








Imagine now that the task were T = 14. In this case, T = 14 > 11 =
P
i∈N p(Ri). Again,
we start by giving to each agent her peak. This implies allocating 11 units, but there are
T0 = 3(= T − (p(R1) + p(R2) + p(R3))) remaining units to allot. Since we are in case (2), we
identify each agent with her opposite peak, that is, we consider the pairs (1,−1), (2,−5), and
(3,−5). According to σ, the pair with the highest priority is (2,−5). Then we give one unit
to agent 2, and we now consider the new pairs (1,−1), (2,−6), and (3,−5). According to σ,
the pair with the highest priority is (2,−6). Then we give one unit to agent 2 and we consider
the new pair (1,−1), (2,−7), and (3,−5). The table shows the rest of the procedure until the






Previous example illustrates how the temporary satisfaction methods work. Additionally, they
show that these methods may violate balancedness. In Example 4.1 both the second and the
third agent have identical preferences. Nevertheless the amount they receive are far away. To
recover balancedness we have to concentrate in a particular subclass of standard of comparison.
Monotonic standard of comparison: For each {i,j} ⊆ N, and each x,y ∈ Z, if x > y, then
σ(i,x) < σ(j,y). Let ΣM denote the subfamily of all monotonic standards of comparison.
In other words, monotonic standards of comparison always give priority to agents with larger








in when a monotonic standard of comparison is imposed.
Example 4.2. Let N = {1,2,3}, and assume that the standard of comparison is monotonic.
Furthermore, σ(1,x) < σ(2,x) < σ(3,x) if x is odd, and σ(1,x) < σ(3,x) < σ(2,x) if x is
even. Now, as in Example 4.1, consider the allocation problem where N = {1,2,3}, T = 6,
and R = (R1,R2,R3) such that R2 = R3 and p(R) = (1,5,5). Applying the aforementioned
procedure, we obtain that TSσ(e) = (1,2,3). If the number of units to allot were T = 14, then
TSσ(e) = (4,5,5).
We call M-temporary satisfaction methods to the temporary satisfaction methods associ-
ated to monotonic standards of comparison. As Example 4.2 suggests, M-temporary satisfaction
methods satisfy balancedness. Moreover, next result sets that only temporary satisfaction meth-
ods induced by a monotonic standard of comparison satisfy such a property.
Theorem 4.1. Let σ ∈ Σ be an standard of comparison. Then, a temporary satisfaction meth-
ods, TSσ, satisﬁes balancedness if and only if σ is monotonic.
As we mentioned above, our goal is to identify eﬃcient, fair (balanced), non-manipulable (strat-
egy proof), and robust (consistent) rules. In our main result, we obtain that there is only one
family of rules compatible with these four requirements: M-temporary satisfaction methods.
The proof, preceded by some lemmas, is relegated to Appendix B.
Theorem 4.2. A rule F satisﬁes eﬃciency, balancedness, strategy proofness, and consistency
if and only if there exists a monotonic standard of comparison σ ∈ ΣM such that F = TSσ.
5 Relations between the discrete and the continuum
In the previous section we obtained a characterization for the family of M-temporary satisfaction
methods. The properties used in such a result (Theorem 4.2) are very much related to those used
by Ching (1994) to characterize the uniform rule.6 We may interpret this fact as a suggestion of a
relationship between our family of methods and the uniform rule. Any M-temporary satisfaction
method can be interpreted as a discrete version of the uniform rule in the following sense. The
allocation prescribed by the uniform rule is the ex-ante expectations of the agents under the
application of M-temporary satisfaction methods, if all monotonic standard of comparison are
equally likely.
6Under the assumption that the task were completely divisible, one of the most widely studied rule is the
so-called uniform rule. The idea underlying this solution is equality distribution of the task.
Uniform rule, u: For each e ∈ A, selects the unique vector u(e) ∈ R
N such that: If
P
i∈N p(Ri) ≥ T,
then u(e) = min{p(Ri),λ} for some λ ∈ R such that
P
i∈N min{p(Ri),λ} = T. And, if
P
i∈N p(Ri) ≤ T, then
u(e) = max{p(Ri),λ} for some λ ∈ R such that
P








Proposition 5.1. Let e ∈ A. Let ΣM
e denote the subset of ΣM of the diﬀerent standards involved









In this work we have considered allocation problems with indivisible goods when the agents’
preferences are single-peaked, that is, problems in which the task, the allocations and the pref-
erences are only deﬁned over the set of integer numbers. Our goal has been obtaining solutions
fulﬁlling eﬃciency, fairness and non-manipulability conditions. To do that, we have deﬁned
the temporary satisfaction methods. These methods are eﬃcient, strategy-proof, and consistent.
Nevertheless, unlike the continuos model, in which we may impose anonymity, when indivisible
units are allotted anonymous rules cannot be obtained. As Example 4.1 shows, in the model
with indivisibilities, the simply requirement of eﬃciency, strategy-proofness, and consistency
may result in extremely unfair allocations. In order to recover a minimal condition of equity we
imposed balancedness. We ﬁnd that the M-temporary satisfaction methods (temporary satisfac-
tion methods associated to a monotonic standard of comparison) are the unique eﬃcient, fair
(balanced), and non-manipulable (strategy-proof and consistent) rules.
We have also noticed that, our family of solutions can be characterized by combinations of
properties similar to those supporting the characterizations of the uniform rule. Besides, the
allocation selected by the uniform rule can be interpreted as the expected allocation of the
M-temporary satisfaction methods, if all plausible monotonic standards were equally likely.
7In Σ
M we consider all monotonic standards over N × Z. Notice that, for a given e, not all of them rank
the pairs (i,ai) involved in that particular problem in diﬀerent ways. Σ
M









Appendix A. On the tightness of characterization result
We present now a collection of examples to illustrate the independence of properties used in
Theorem 4.2.
Example 6.1. Let : N −→ Z++ be an order deﬁned over the set of potential agents such that
agent labeled i has priority over agent labeled i+1, i.e., i  i+1. The rule G works as follows.
Let e ∈ A. Give to each agent the integer part of the equal split allocation,8 that is bT
nc for each
i ∈ N. If no unit remains we have ﬁnished. If some units, T0 = T − n · bT
nc, remain, then allot
each one of them to each one of the T0 agents with the highest priority according to .
Example 6.2. Consider the standard σ1 such that σ1(i,x) < σ1(i + 1,y). That is, σ1 is an
standard in which the smaller the agent’s label the higher the priority. Let us consider now the
temporary satisfaction method associated to this standard, TSσ1.
Example 6.3. Alternative to the temporary satisfaction methods, in which we start by fully
satisfy all the agents, we may think in allocating the task unit by unit starting from giving
nothing to each agent. Let σ ∈ Σ. Then
Up method associated to σ, Uσ: Let e ∈ A. Start by associating to each agent his peak,
and then identifying the agent with the strongest number (peak) according to σ. Then give one
unit of the task, T, to this agent. Reduce his number (peak) by one unit. Now identify the
agent with the new strongest number for σ, and proceed in the same way. Repeat this process
until the task runs out.
If σ ∈ σM, the resulting method is called M-up method.
Example 6.4. This rule, F, can be deﬁned as follows. Let σ1,σ2 ∈ ΣM be two diﬀerent
monotonic standards such that σ1(i,x) < σ1(i + 1,x) and σ2(i + 1,x) < σ2(i,x). Then, we
deﬁne the solution F(σ1,σ2) as
F(σ1,σ2)(e) =
(
TSσ1(e) if |N| = 2
TSσ2(e) otherwise
Next table shows the independence of properties in Theorem 4.2 are independent.
Property G TSσ1 Uσ(σ ∈ ΣM) F(σ1,σ2)
Eﬃciency N Y Y Y
Balancedness Y N Y Y
Strategy-proofness Y Y N Y
Consistency Y Y Y N
Table 1: Independence of properties.








Appendix B. Proofs of the results
Lemma 6.1 (Elevator Lemma, (Thomson (2004))). If a rule F is consistent and coincides with
a conversely consistent rule F0 in the two agent case, then it coincides with F0 in general.9
Lemma 6.2. Eﬃciency and strategy-proofness together imply peaks only.10
Proof. Let F be a rule fulﬁlling strategy-proofness. Let e = (N,T,(Ri,R−i)) ∈ A and e0 =
(N,T,(R0
i,R−i)) ∈ A such that p(R0




j∈N p(Rj). Let us suppose that this is not true, and xi 6= x0
i. We can assume without
loss of generality that xi < x0
i. If this is the case, eﬃciency implies that xi < x0
i ≤ p(Ri) =
p(R0
i). Then, x0
iPixi, which means that Fi(N,T,(R0
i,R−i))PiFi(N,T,(Ri,R−i)). This implies a
contradiction with strategy-proofness. Therefore xi = x0
i.
The case when T ≥
P
j∈N p(Rj) is analogous.
Lemma 6.3. One-sided resource monotonicity together with consistency imply converse consis-
tency.11
Proof. Let e ∈ A. By consistency the set c.con(e;F) 6= φ. Let x,y ∈ c.con(e;F) with x 6= y.
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. If
P
i∈N p(Ri) ≥ T. Since, x 6= y, there exists k ∈ N such that xk > yk. Consider each
two-agent set S = {k,j} with j ∈ N and j 6= k. Since x,y ∈ c.con(e;F), xS = F(S,xj +
xk,RS) and yS = F(S,yj + yk,RS). By eﬃciency and one-sided resource monotonicity,
xj ≥ yj. This fact, join with xk > yk, and
P
i∈N xi = T =
P
i∈N yi yields a contradiction.
Case 2. If
P
i∈N p(Ri) ≤ T. There exists k ∈ N such that xk < yk. Consider each two-agent
set S = {k,j} with j ∈ N and j 6= k. Since x,y ∈ c.con(T,R;F), xS = F(S,xj + xk,RS)
and yS = F(S,yj + yk,RS). By eﬃciency and one-sided resource monotonicity, xj ≤ yj.
This fact, join with xk < yk, and
P
i∈N xi = T =
P
i∈N yi yields a contradiction.
9Let us consider an allocation for a problem with the following feature: For each two-agents subset, the rule
chooses the restriction of that allocation for the associated reduced problem to this agent subset. Converse
consistency requires the allocation to be the one selected by the rule for the original problem. This property was
formulated by Chun (1999) in the context of claims problems.




i∈N xi = T and for all S ⊂ N such that |S| = 2,xS = F(S,
P
i∈S xi,RS)}
Converse consistency: For each e ∈ A, c.con(e;F) 6= φ, and if x ∈ c.con(e;F), then x = F(e).
10Peaks only says that an agent’s allocation depends only on his preferred consumption.
Peaks only: For each e = (N,T,(Ri,R−i)) ∈ A and each e
0 = (N,T,(R
0
i,R−i)) ∈ A such that p(R
0
i) = p(Ri),
then Fi(e) = Fi(e
0).
11One-sided resource monotonicity, considers the case in which the change in the task does not alter the type
of rationing associated to the initial problem, i.e, if initially we have to ration labor, it is still labor to be rationed
after the task increasing, or else, if in the initial problem we have to ration leisure, then again, we have too much
labor to allocate even after the decreasing of the task. In either case, the property states that no agent should
suﬀer.
One-sided resource monotonicity: For each e,e
0 ∈ A such that e = (N,T,R) and e
0 = (N,T
0,R). If (a) P
j∈N p(Rj) ≥ T
0 > T, or (b)
P
j∈N p(Rj) ≤ T









Lemma 6.4. Let F be a rule satisfying eﬃciency, balancedness, and strategy-proofnes. Let
e,e0 ∈ A be two problems involving two agents, {i,j}, such that e = ({i,j},T,(R,R)); e0 =
({i,j},T,(R0,R0)) such that either both 2p(R), 2p(R0) are strictly larger or both strictly smaller
than T. Then, F(e) = F(e0).
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the case where 2p(R) > T, 2p(R0) > T. Let R00 be such that p(R00) = T+1
2 ,
and let e00 = ({i,j},T,(R00,R00)). We shall prove that F(e) = F(e00) = F(e0).
If T is even, balancedness implies the result. Let T = 2λ + 1, for some λ ∈ Z, and suppose,
w.l.o.g., that F(e00) = (λ,λ + 1), whereas F(e) = (λ + 1,λ). This is the only possibility of
discrepancy because of eﬃciency and balancedness. Since p(R) ≥ p(R00) = λ + 1, agent j is
happier in problem e00 than he is in problem e, and it is the other way around for agent i.
Additionally, strategy proofness implies that
Fi({i,j},T,(R,R00)) ≤ λ; Fj({i,j},T,(R,R00)) ≤ λ
The ﬁrst inequality follows from agent i’s inability to get a better result when misrepresenting
his preferences in problem e00, while the second inequality follows from agent j’s inability to
beneﬁt from misrepresenting his preferences in problem e. But, if this is the case,
Fi({i,j},T,(R,R”)) + Fj({i,j},T,(R,R”)) ≤ 2λ < T
which is a contradiction with F being a rule.
The case where 2p(R) < T, 2p(R0) < T is analogous.
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
It is straightforward to check that any M-temporary satisfaction method satisﬁes balancedness.
Conversely, we will show that if TSσ is balanced then σ ∈ ΣM. Let us suppose that this is not
true and there exists σ ∈ ΣrΣM such that TSσ is balanced. Since σ / ∈ ΣM, there exist {i,j} ∈ N
and x,y ∈ Z such that x > y and σ(j,y) < σ(i,x). By deﬁnition of standard of comparison,
we have that σ(j,x) < σ(j,y) < σ(i,x). Consider now the problem e = ({i,j},2x − 2,(Ri,Rj))
where Ri = Rj and p(Ri) = p(Rj) = x; then TSσ(e) = (x,x − 2) violating balancedness. We
reach in the way a contradiction and, therefore, σ ∈ ΣM.
Proof of Theorem 4.2
It is easy to check that each TSσ satisﬁes the four properties. Conversely, let F be a rule
satisfying all the properties. We divide the rest of the proof into two steps.
Step 1. Deﬁnition of the monotonic standard of comparison. Let us deﬁne the order σ ∈ ΣM as
follows
a > b ⇒ σ(i,a) < σ(j,b)








where Ri and Rj are two single-peaked preference relations such that p(Ri) = a = b =
p(Rj) (by Lemma 6.2 it is enough to consider the peaks). It is straightforward to see that
such a σ is complete and antisymmetric. Let us show that σ is transitive. Suppose that
there exist {i,j,k} ⊆ N such that σ(i,x) < σ(j,y), σ(j,y) < σ(k,z), but σ(i,x) > σ(k,z).
By construction and peaks only (implied by eﬃciency and strategy proofness according to
Lemma 6.2), this can only happen when x = y = z. By the deﬁnition of σ, in such a case,
Fi({i,j},2x−1,(Ri,Rj)) = x−1, Fj({j,k},2x−1,(Rj,Rk)) = x−1, and Fk({k,i},2x−
1,(Rk,Ri)) = x − 1, where p(Ri) = p(Rj) = p(Rk) = x = y = z. Consider the problem
({i,j,k},3x − 2,(Ri,Rj,Rk)). There are only three possible allocations: (x − 1,x − 1,x),
(x − 1,x,x − 1), and (x,x − 1,x − 1). Suppose that F({i,j,k},3x − 2,(Ri,Rj,Rk)) =
(x − 1,x − 1,x), by consistency, Fk({i,k},2x − 1,(Ri,Rk)) = x, achieving in this way a
contradiction with Fk({i,k},2x − 1,(Ri,Rj)) = x − 1. An analogous argument is applied
if F({i,j,k},3x−2,(Ri,Rj,Rk)) = (x−1,x,x−1), or if F({i,j,k},3x−2,(Ri,Rj,Rk)) =
(x,x − 1,x − 1). Therefore σ(i,x) < σ(k,z), and then σ is transitive.
Step 2. Let us prove now that F = TSσ. It is straightforward that TSσ is eﬃciency, one-sided
resource monotonic, and consistent, then, by Lemma 6.3, TSσ is conversely consistent.
Therefore, in application of Lemma 6.1, it is enough to show that F = TSσ in the two-
agent case. Then, let us consider the problem e = (S,T,R) ∈ A where S = {i,j}.
Without loss of generality we can assume that p(Ri) ≤ p(Rj). We analyze the case in
which p(Ri) + p(Rj) ≥ T. The other case is completely analogous. We distinguish the
following cases:






Case 2. If Ri = Rj and T is odd. If T = 2p(Ri) − 1, by the deﬁnition of the














Case 3. If Fi(e) ≤ Fj(e) ≤ p(Ri) ≤ p(Rj). By eﬃciency and strategy proofness, Fi(e) =
Fi(S,T,(Rj,Rj))= TSσ
i (S,T,(Rj,Rj)) = TSσ
i (e).
Case 4. If Fj(e) ≤ Fi(e) ≤ p(Ri) ≤ p(Rj). By eﬃciency and strategy proofness, Fj(e) =
Fj(S,T,(Ri,Ri)) = TSσ
j (S,T,(Ri,Ri)) = TSσ
j (e).
Case 5. If Fi(e) ≤ p(Ri) < Fj(e) ≤ p(Rj). By eﬃciency and strategy proofness, Fi(e) =
Fi(S,T,(Rj,Rj)) = TSσ
i (S,T,(Rj,Rj)) = TSσ
i (e). If Fi(e) = TSσ
i (e) = p(Ri), then
Fj(e) = T −Fi(e) = T −TSσ
i (e) = TSσ
j (e). If Fi(e) ≤ p(Ri)−1, then Fj(e) ≤ p(Ri),
which is a contradiction.
Then, F coincides with TSσ in the two agents case, and therefore they do so in general.








On one hand, it is known that the uniform rule satisﬁes converse consistency. On the other
hand, it is easy to check that the M-temporary satisfaction methods are consistent. Then the
average given by the left hand side in the formula is also consistent (see Thomson (2004)). By
using the Lemma 6.1 it is enough to consider the two-agent case. But it is straightforward that
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